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New Zealand’s new health sector reforms: back to the
future?
Nancy Devlin, Alan Maynard, Nicholas Mays
New Zealand attracted much international attention in
the late 1980s and 1990s for its radical economic and
social reforms. This reforming tendency shows no
signs of abating. In late 1999 the national (conserva›
tive) government was replaced by a Labour led
coalition, which is rapidly and significantly changing
the way publicly financed health services are organised.
Before the general election, Labour had criticised
the national government’s quasimarket system for its
narrow focus on the production of services rather than
the improvement of health, for having fragmented a
public service, for fostering inappropriate commercial
behaviour, for increasing transaction costs, and for
lacking local democratic input.1 These problems were
attributed to the “corporate model” of public hospital
provision and a single, national purchasing agency.
Both will now be replaced with a system promoted as
allowing greater community “voice” in health sector
decision making and “putting the public back into the
public health system.”
This paper reviews New Zealand’s experience with
the quasimarket model and appraises the rationale for
another round of structural change. We identify
challenges policymakers face in achieving their goals,
consider the general lessons provided by New
Zealand’s frequent U›turns in policy, and offer a set of
criteria against which the new system might be
assessed.
New Zealand’s “experiment with
competition”
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, dissatisfaction
with New Zealand’s health system—comprising 14
locally elected area health boards, which both “funded”
and provided hospital and some other services in their
regions, was rife. Reports pointed to inefficiencies,
poor management, budget overruns, and badly eroded
assets in public hospitals.2 Waiting lists were increasing,
and falling public confidence in the system was associ›
ated with a growth in private insurance.3 Area health
boards were criticised for facing no clear incentives to
be efficient or responsive to patients and for weak
accountability.4
The promarket philosophy of the prevailing
governnment led, in 1993, to an attempt to introduce
the perceived advantages of a competitive market into
the publicly funded healthcare sector. At the heart of
this model was the full separation of purchasing and
providing. It was hoped to increase efficiency, contain
expenditure, and reduce waiting lists.4 Purchasing was
undertaken by four ministerially appointed regional
health authorities. Hospitals became publicly owned
companies called Crown health enterprises subject to
normal company law and required to earn a rate of
return on capital comparable to that of a business in
the private sector. The original scheme (unlike the
NHS model) had been to develop competition not
only among providers but also between publicly
funded “health plans” for patient enrolments, but this
was never implemented.5
The disappointing outcomes of this “experiment
with competition” provide a sharp contrast with the
overoptimistic expectations of its proponents6 and are
partly a product of difficulties in measurement and
substantial lags between cause and effect. Little compe›
Summary points
New Zealand is implementing major changes to
the way the health system is organised
The key elements are the development of
national strategies and radical restructuring of the
healthcare system
The changes reject the current quasimarket
approach. Twenty one largely elected district
health boards will be responsible for planning
most services and delivering hospital services
Challenges facing the new system include the
tension between local autonomy and national
consistency, avoiding hospital domination
designing a defensible formula for allocating
funds to district health boards, and ensuring that
the reorganisation achieves the government’s
health goals
Evaluation plays little part in health sector
restructuring in New Zealand
A commitment to evaluation in terms of equity,
efficiency, and acceptability would improve the
accountability of politicians and might avoid
frequent, disruptive, and costly U›turns in policy
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tition occurred between providers, especially hospi›
tals.3 5 Many Crown health enterprises inherited and
continued to report deficits.3 5 Barriers to entry limited
contestability,7 purchasers were conservative and
dominated by providers, and barriers to exit (financial
support of deficit ridden Crown health enterprises)
arguably weakened economic incentives.3 Purchasers
and providers struggled to establish contractual
relation, transition and transactions costs were high,5
and the expected savings were not made.5 8
Thus evidence suggests that the quasimarket model
did not achieve obviously greater efficiency. In 1996 a
briefing to the incoming minister of Crown health
enterprises stated “the health reforms have yet to yield
the original expectations. By a range of measures . . .
the pace of performance seems, if anything, to have
weakened since the advent of the reforms.”5
There were further concerns. The model empha›
sised the production of service outputs, with too little
attention to the quality of services and their effects on
health outcomes. Major inquiries into quality of care
and patient safety argued (whether justifiably or not)
that the quasimarket model contributed directly to
specific instances of poor care.9 Further, there was a
crucial lack of “buy›in” among both health profession›
als and the general public. The demoralisation and dis›
empowerment of the health workforce have been
attributed to tensions arising from the clash of
managerial and clinical cultures.10 11
Some gains did follow the reforms: activity rates
continued to increase and average length of stay and
unit costs to fall—although whether this was because
of, or despite, the changes is a moot point.3 Better
information systems facilitated greater accountability
and better management of capital.5 Mäori copurchas›
ers and providers were better able to attract funding to
provide more culturally appropriate services.
In 1996, New Zealand’s first proportionally elected
coalition government compromised by renaming
Crown health enterprises more neutrally as “hospital
and health services” and removed their “for profit” sta›
tus. “Cooperation” replaced “competition” as the new
political catch›cry and the regional health authorities
were replaced by a single purchaser, the Health Fund›
ing Authority.12 Thus key parts of the market model
had already been discarded. The system inherited by
the current government bore relatively little resem›
blance to that originally planned.
Back to the future: the current changes
The current government is winding the clock back still
further, returning the system towards its earlier local
political origins and away from a “corporate rational›
ist” model,13 by reinstating locally elected boards and
abolishing the purchaser›provider split. The changes
currently taking place concern two main initiatives
(box).
The strategies being developed have been deliber›
ately largely built on existing policies and have
attracted little controversy so far. The structural
changes, however, represent a radical departure from
the current system and have required primary
legislation. Its main provisions are outlined in the box.
Opinion is divided on the merits of these changes. Ref›
erences to the Treaty of Waitangi in the legislation have
been hotly debated. The Act, however, makes it plain
that there is no intention of giving Mäori preferential
access to services. Rather, the government aims to send
a signal to district health boards that it is serious about
its intentions to close the health gap between Mäori
and non›Mäori.
Many New Zealanders welcome the return to a
familiar public service model. Others have argued that
the reforms are “a white elephant trundling back to an
inefficient past.”14 Still others agree with the spirit of the
changes but question the need for extensive restructur›
ing to achieve them. Arguably, improved local
input—seemingly the central aim of restructuring—
could be partly achieved by incremental changes to the
current system. Another interpretation is that the
changes are largely a “political branding” exercise; or,
more positively, that restructuring is needed to signal a
clear break with quasimarket approaches.
Challenges facing the new system
The current changes restore a form of local
governance very similar to the area health boards that
Two principal components of current changes
to New Zealand’s health sector
• Structural changes, which replace the current
purchaser›provider separation with arrangements to
integrate these functions, at least for publicly owned
providers and to strengthen local, democratic input to
decisions
• Development of national strategies to guide the
system; these identify objectives and priorities for
improving health and independence levels in the
population, aim to reduce the health “gap” between
Mäori and non›Mäori, and specify how services should
be delivered
Main provisions of New Zealand’s new health
legislation
• The abolition of the Health Funding Authority
• The transfer of most of the Health Funding
Authority’s functions to 21 new district health boards,
comprising a majority of locally elected and a minority
of ministerially appointed members, accountable to
the Minister of Health. District health boards will plan
most health and disability support—that is, social
care—services (although some services will be funded
nationally by the Ministry of Health) and will be
responsible for the level, mix, and quality of services
and for meeting the health goals, targets, and
standards set by the Minister of Health. Public
hospitals will be owned and managed by the district
health boards
• A minimum of two of the 9›11 board members of
the district health board to be Mäori
• Mechanisms at the district health board level to
enable Mäori to contribute to decision making and to
participate in the delivery of services so that the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840 between
the Crown and Mäori are recognised and respected in
the health sector
• The allocation of funding between district health
boards according to a formula based on the resident
population weighted for relative health need
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managed hospital and related services before 1993.
That system continued to appeal to those politicians
and members of the public who were never reconciled
to the quasimarket because it included democratic
input, and the area health boards’ financial perform›
ance was no worse than their successor Crown health
enterprises in their early years. But the changes now
being planned cannot amount to a simple return to the
past. Public expectations are more demanding today, as
are requirements for accountability in the public
sector. The new arrangements will have to take these
factors into account.
The desire for local autonomy in decision making
will have to be balanced against national consistency in
access to health care (a much cherished goal in New
Zealand). Although local representation is a key
element of these changes, the government also plans
to put in place relatively strict upward accountability
arrangements that provide a potentially powerful
means for ministers to control the actions of district
health boards to secure compliance with national
objectives and reasonable consistency in provision.
Localism and centralism are never easily reconciled.
It will be important to avoid actual (or perceived)
hospital dominance of the new system. For pragmatic
reasons the existing infrastructure of hospital manage›
ment is being used as the initial basis of the district
health boards, and the population of each board
approximates to the local catchment of its hospital. A
coherent approach to planning, funding, and improv›
ing access to non›hospital services—particularly pri›
mary health care—will be crucial, as this has been the
Achilles’ heel of the system since its creation in 1938.
Government’s commitment to developing better
primary care15 and disability support will have to be
reflected in the requirements for service development
placed on district health boards and monitored
accordingly.
The creation of a large number of districts (21,
compared with 14 under the area health board
system), some with small, dispersed populations, resur›
rects the challenge of designing a population based
formula to allocate resources in a fair and defensible
manner. Smaller districts may find it more difficult to
manage within their budgets than larger entities; risk
management issues will become more visible than with
a national purchaser. Twenty one district health boards
may not be a sustainable number.
It will also be necessary to keep public expectations
within realistic bounds. Some of the early claims on
behalf of the changes have been excessively optimistic,
just as were the claims for making the health system
more business like in the late 1980s. An early presenta›
tion on the reforms suggested that “the drive to change
the health system comes from gaps between the
system’s ability to provide and the public perception of
need.”16 Economists have long argued that such gaps
are unavoidable in a publicly financed system: restruc›
turing cannot remove the rationing problem. Perhaps
the best that can be hoped for is that district health
boards are perceived as more legitimate rationing
agents than the inevitably more remote and techno›
cratic Health Funding Authority.17
Finally, it will be vital to ensure that the structural
changes directly assist in achieving the goals of the
health strategies. The risk with a three year electoral
cycle is that putting new institutions in place becomes
the end of the process rather than the beginning of a
renewed quest for better delivery of services. Yet there
are likely to be greater benefits in examining the fun›
damental questions such as which services should be
delivered, in what quantities, and to whom? How can
they be provided most cost effectively? And what
trade›offs will the public accept between maximising
health, distributing the gains according to some
notion of fairness, improving responsiveness, and
other stated goals? New Zealand has made consider›
able progress in working towards explicit service
prioritisation at a national level.18 It is uncertain how
21 district health boards will have the capacity to build
on this effort.
Alongside the challenges facing the new system,
there are some encouraging signs. One is that the pace
of change has not prevented extensive consultation on
the content of the strategies. Another is that a
conscious effort seems to be under way not to lose
institutional knowledge and experienced staff during
the transition.
Learning from the past
Some important general lessons can be learnt from
New Zealand’s experience with health sector reform.
Firstly, structural change is a tempting way of marking
a new ethos, but making new laws may, paradoxically,
distract attention from effecting change at the service
delivery level. It may take the focus away from other
more fundamental issues that are not related to struc›
ture, in particular the appraisal of clinical performance
and the improvement of implicit and explicit incentive
mechanisms.
Secondly, restructuring takes time to do, to “bed
down” and to deliver results—it may not be evident for
some time what has occurred and even then the
“counterfactual” (what would the outcomes have been
under the old regime?) remains unknown.
Continual restructuring is costly and disruptive.
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in compara›
tive assessment, in New Zealand, as elsewhere, a greater
commitment to policy evaluation is required. Restruc›
A familiar public services model: New Zealand’s new district health boards will both plan
healthcare and deliver hospital services
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turing proposals should be accompanied by clearly
stated, measurable objectives against which the new
system’s performance can be monitored and scruti›
nised. Proposals for change should also be accompa›
nied by estimates of the transitional and ongoing costs
to be incurred in pursuit of its benefits.
Commitment to the routine measurement and
publication of key indicators of the performance of the
health system would also greatly improve the ability of
politicians to justify and be held accountable for struc›
tural change and of the public to engage in informed
debate. A template for such assessments could include,
for example: indicators of the technical efficiency of
providers, transactions costs as a proportion of total
spending, horizontal equity (the extent to which those
with similar levels of need receive similar services),
reductions in levels of ill health and of health inequal›
ity attributable to health services, and users’ experi›
ences of services.
New Zealand’s health sector is headed back to the
future. Whether that future holds the solutions to New
Zealanders’ health aspirations is unclear. A commit›
ment to rigorous evaluation of the current social
experiment is required to determine whether the
future is better than the past.
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Appraising organised screening programmes for testing
for genetic susceptibility to cancer
Vivek Goel for Crossroads 99 Group
Public health officials rely on criteria developed by
Wilson and Jungner for assessing whether or not to
implement population screening programmes. These
criteria were developed over 30 years ago, when
screening primarily focused on detecting early stages
or precursors of chronic disease. With the introduction
of testing for genetic susceptibility, particularly for can›
cer, it is important to assess whether these criteria can
continue to be applied in the decision making process.
We report on a workshop that assessed criteria for
population screening in the context of testing for
genetic susceptibility to cancer.
Many criteria for the evaluation of screening
programmes have been proposed,1 2 and most are
similar to those proposed by Wilson and Jungner in a
1968 World Health Organization report.3 The criteria
are based on a simple linear model of disease progres›
sion (figure) in which screening tests primarily detect a
preclinical asymptomatic phase.
The continuum of screening has expanded to
include a range of other states. The figure illustrates
another model for screening—screening for risk
factors or susceptibility, the detection of risk factors for
disease4 (such as blood pressure or cholesterol concen›
tration), or the identification, through the detection of
genetic markers, of individuals who have increased
susceptibility to disease.5 Separate consideration of
Details of the
workshop
participants can be
found on the BMJ’s
website
Summary points
Screening has expanded from early detection of
disease or its precursors to include testing for
susceptibility, such as genetic testing for cancer
The Wilson and Jungner framework for
evaluating screening tests, produced for the World
Health Organization in 1968, is commonly used
for population screening
The relevance of this framework for testing for
genetic susceptibility to cancer has not previously
been assessed
A modified Wilson and Jungner framework can
continue to provide a robust approach to
evaluating testing for genetic susceptibility
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